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Review of Adrian Franklin, Nature and Social Theory 
"Modern accounts emphasised the difference between humanity and nature and set 
up independent sciences for each domain ... [but] this book contends that fabricated 
boundaries between nature and culture have been breached both in practice and in new 
theoretical accounts." 
These introductory statements from the back cover of the book w i l l attract the many 
students of the natural world who have felt torn between widely divergent natural science 
and cultural theory accounts of nature. Dipping deeper into the book, however, the student 
w i l l quickly realise that the 'nature' Franklin is concerned with is both quite exclusive and 
very broad. For example, among his targets are 'realists' and 'environmentalists' who "want 
to uphold and defend a pure and unsullied nature against a disordered (and sick) 
humanity" (p. 6), and so are responsible - together with "scientists and naturalists" (p. 14) -
for the "misanthropic gloom" which "pervades the entire research enterprise on nature" (p. 
5). Also in his sights are authors such as Macnaghton and Urry who "commit the folly" of 
conflating "a sociology of nature with a sociology of nature leisures and tourism" (p. 7), and 
books such as Alexander Wilson's The Culture of Nature which have a "tendency to reduce a 
sociology of modern nature to that of the environmental agenda", (p. 5), and so are "drawn 
into the gravity of risk, pollution, and environmentalism" (p. 6). 
In contrast to these various viewpoints, Franklin suggests that "[njature is whatever 
happens to result from the interaction between species including the actions and designs of 
man" (p. 9). Quoting from Budd's work on aesthetics, Franklin suggests that "[a]lthough a 
natural item is often not in its natural state or natural location or habitat, or has arisen only 
through human contrivance or as an intended or unintended consequence of human activity 
... or is adjacent to or surrounded by non-natural items ... this does not prevent it from 
being appreciated aesthetically as na tura l . . . " (p. 85). Consequently, "[e] ven a caged w i l d 
animal in a zoo or the water in a fountain can be appreciated as nature." (p. 86). So much for 
ecosystems. Similarly, "industrial and commercial landscapes are just as much habitats to 
animals and birds"; and the "myriad pipes in an oil refinery near London provides the 
perfect resting place for migrating birds" (p. 10). Given this view that nature is 'whatever 
happens', the possibility that the natural world might have been in any way damaged by 
industrial 'progress' is methodologically excluded; and Franklin is at pains to "deny the 
validity of claims that modernisation destroyed or eclipsed nature" (p. 58). This reading 
contrasts sharply with those which see current forms of nature as the outcome of historical 
processes from which it emerges as changed, and sometimes as reduced and degraded. 
If Franklin's account is strongly oriented towards the present day, it is equally 
resolutely focused on the social. 'What is nature?', he argues, "is no doubt an interesting 
philosophical question, but it is not for sociologists to pose or attempt to answer such 
questions. Rather, our job is to understand what these words ... mean and do for the people 
who use them ... in this way we can dodge a very complex question by suggesting that 
nature is a construction of culture" (p. 21). This exclusively social understanding, by 
identifying nature with cultural interpretations of nature, sidesteps the need to consider 
how these interpretations might be inadequate, how they are located within a long-term 
temporal context, or how nature - and alternative understandings of nature - might diverge 
from them. While this approach may indeed produce answers to a narrow range of 
questions, 'dodging' deeper, more inclusive, and arguably more urgent questions w i l l not 
satisfy those who believe that the character and meaning of social knowledge can only be 
assessed with reference to the various contexts within which it arises. Similarly, the claim 
that '[s]ociology is almost exclusively urban in location and has been able to ignore the 
nature of the countryside or wilderness as an irrelevant variable . . . " (p. 24) w i l l seem less 
than adequate to those who argue that some of the most compelling questions facing the 
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natural world involve precisely these excluded areas. Equally, the reader w i l l find no 
mention of forest destruction, climate change, or loss of biodiversity; or the implications of 
trade rules, genetic engineering, or emissions trading. 
Although he adopts a broadly constructivist approach, Franklin is clearly sensitive to 
the criticisms that critical realists have made of the 'strong' constructionist agenda, arguing 
that nature is "at once a physical reality, amenable to the senses and discursively ordered ... 
nature is constituted as an objective reality but may be further constituted socially in all 
manner of ways" (p. 38). Consequently, "social constructions of nature do not and should 
not obliterate the value of conceptualising nature also as an objective reality, a real 
materiality that exists prior to any social constructions that people may put on it" (p. 51). A n 
immediate question that arises from this dual conceptualisation is that having recognised 
nature as a "real materiality", one cannot reasonably lay aside the character and practical 
consequences of this materiality while focusing largely on what is socially constructed. 
Furthermore, our experience of nature, it seems, partly exists prior to these constructions: "the 
process by which nature is constructed is preceded, presumably, by the experience of it in 
an unconstructed or differently constructed condition and this presupposes that the natural 
world is experienced in two quite separate moments" (p. 51). More specifically, nature "can 
be experienced in an everyday manner ... principally through an embodied sensual relation 
in which the species being of nature can be identified as separable from any constructions 
being put on it" (p. 51). 
While it is perfectly reasonable to argue that nature has both a material constitution 
independent of what we make of it, and that it may also afford a range of social 
constructions, one might expect that the former would in some respects constrain the latter. 
For example, while we might plausibly perceive a bolt of lightning as the act of an angry 
god, it is more difficult to construe, say, a crocus petal in the same way. Franklin plays 
down this problem: in his discussion of pets, for example, he argues that "it does not follow 
that an understanding of [pets'] natural properties prevents any social construction from 
being placed on top of or alongside such knowledge" (p. 44). But while I might plausibly 
name a pet Doberman 'Killer' , there would be something faintly incongruous about this 
name when applied to, say, a guinea pig. Nevertheless, the relation between nature and 
culture, we are told, works in only one direction: " [n] ature is understood in social terms and 
not the other way around" (p. 236). 
This claim, curiously, is contradicted by some of the material Franklin himself refers 
to. In one of the most interesting sections of the book, he discusses anthropological studies 
of the relation between culture and nature, arguing that the way we construct our 
relationship with nature is not simply a semiotic or discursive matter but also involves a 
strongly practical, material element. Furthermore, the relationship with nature involves a 
complex accommodation between the social and the natural, expressed by concepts such as 
Ingold's 'dwelling', Latour's 'hybridity', or Descola's view that there is a 'single social field' 
which has both natural and cultural elements. Some of the material included, drawn from 
the work of Laura Rival, implies a more naturalistic viewpoint, suggesting that 
"unmediated or perceptual knowledge about the landscape, particularly of living things, 
can affect cultural choices and produce patterns of aesthetic judgement and social life" (p. 
72). For example, drawing on Rival's work with the Huaorani, Franklin points out that a 
"concern with the right speed of growth is inferred from tree species onto human growth 
and maturity ... [t]he aesthetic of slow growth derives from two types of tree they greatly 
admire, the very tall canopy species and in particular the peachpalm trees that grow very 
slowly" (p. 73). 
Recognising that natural form and process enter into the generation of social 
understandings is certainly a step forward from single-mindedly constructivist accounts; 
and Franklin's discussion of 'a new anthropology of nature' offers the reader some exciting 
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insights into the interplay between nature and culture. Elsewhere in the book, however, 
there is a more one-sided emphasis on "the socially constructed nature of human 
understandings of the natural wor ld" (p. 236). Some would argue that given that the social 
world has only developed out of the pre-existing natural world during the most recent 
eyeblink of evolutionary time, one might expect that the ways humans interact with nature 
would in some ways reflect this evolutionary history. In Kellert and Wilson's words, "the 
brain evolved in a biocentric world, not a machine-regulated world. It would therefore be 
quite extraordinary to find that all learning relating to that world had been erased in a few 
thousand years . . . " (p. 232-3). This possibility is strongly rejected by Franklin, who claims 
that "it is clear that in fact, the argument flows the other way, namely, contemporary 
concerns for, and expressions of value in nature are being projected back into deep history, 
about which Kellert and Wilson know very little . . . " (p. 237). Apart from the likelihood that 
one of the foremost evolutionary biologists of our era probably knows a great deal about 
'deep history' (whatever that is), the claim that "what we find attractive, secure, reassuring, 
calming, spiritual etc. in nature is entirely given in our discourses on nature; they are 
cultural creations . . . " (p. 238) needs to be carefully argued and supported if it is to be at all 
convincing. Simply stating that "it is clear that in fact... ", "it is only too obvious that . . ." 
(p. 237) one viewpoint is correct, while dismissing opposing views as 'social constructions', 
'dubious mobilisations', and so on is to relativise others' knowledge whilst claiming a more 
absolute type of knowledge as one's own. 
As Robert Macfarlane has written, all great works of place investigate not only "the 
question of how humans shape the landscape, but also the deeper and prior mystery of how 
landscape shapes the human."1 Franklin's denial of the significance of this latter question 
exemplifies his general rejection of science; and he is keen to establish that a sociology of 
nature need not take into account any scientific claims. Defending constructionists such as 
Keith Tester against the criticisms of critical realists, he notes that "[a]t no point did Tester 
evaluate the science of the claims of animal rights, his material for analysis were the claims 
themselves," adding that "this is surely a very standardised, almost safe procedure in the 
analysis of the natural world" (p. 44). Similarly, "[Burningham and Cooper] argue that the 
political debate on environmentalism centres on the making of knowledge claims and 
therefore the expertise of constructionism is a far better mobilisation of sociology than the 
dubious mobilisations of contestable scientific truths" (p. 46). This approach, we are told, 
places sociologists "at the heart of environmental debate" (p. 46). It is questionable, 
however, whether an exclusively social analysis which brackets off the epistemological 
status of the social constructions it studies is any more defensible than the mirror-image 
position which claims that natural scientists can bracket off cultural issues as irrelevant. 
The later chapters of the book illustrate and extend the theoretical positions 
described earlier. Despite his denunciation of the 'biophilia' hypothesis", Franklin suggests 
that "people from many different times and locations seem to find delight, pleasure and 
[beauty] in nature", reflecting an aesthetic response that may be "generalised in humanity" 
(p. 86). Consequently, we in the affluent West are "re-embedding" ourselves into the natural 
world through such pursuits as gardening, dog walking, and angling: "[a]lthough much of 
our natural environment displays ... the influence of humanity, having been shaped ... by 
human purposes, so that little of the world's landscape is in a natural condition ... this is not 
an impediment to the aesthetic appreciation of nature as nature . . . " (p. 85). Rather, Franklin 
gives plentiful examples of the ways "older relations relocated and recomposed around new 
objects, new practices, new social and cultural needs" (p. 81). Thus "[g]ardens and garden 
suburbs" are "one of the best and most prominent examples of the manner by which 
human-non-human hybrids have been developed and embraced by modern cultures", 
incorporating "[n]atural things as detachable from natural spaces and as highly 
manipulated and fragmented by humanity" (pp. 81/2). Nature, he argues, can flourish even 
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in the most surprising places: for example, a "recent nature documentary Living Britain is 
explicitly about the hybrid natures of contemporary Britain", showing, among other 
illustrations, "foxes living on municipal rubbish dumps (an inevitable natural uncrowded 
niche affording them security and privacy)" (p. 189). In sum, after "a long history of 
maintaining a separation, humanity and the natural world dissolved into each other . . . " (p. 
247). 
It is a strength of Franklin's analysis are that he is prepared to recognise new 
expressions of nature; and his aim of overcoming dualistic cultural attitudes is one that 
many would applaud. His approach, however, embodies certain dangers which are not 
easily overcome. For example, the weight given to current, urban cultural practices and 
understandings precludes any external frame of reference through which these practices 
and understandings could be evaluated, and so is a precarious basis for a general sociology 
of nature. One such frame of reference is the evolutionary process out of which human 
social life and the rest of the natural world evolved; and another is the character, and, some 
would say, the intrinsic value of those relatively w i l d areas of the natural world which 
remain. By excluding such considerations from his analysis, Franklin also excludes some of 
the crucial issues issues and debates facing humanity today. A t the time I am writing this, 
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, produced by 1,300 of the world's leading scientists, 
has just reported that the welfare of future generations w i l l be at risk without a fundamental 
reappraisal of how we use the world's natural resources; and if sociology is to make the sort 
of contribution that is so urgently needed, such issues cannot be bracketed off as irrelevant. 
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